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Deconstructing the Wall:  
The Analysis and Implications of the 2004 International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on 
the Use of Border Walls  
 
Introduction to the Israeli Barrier 
 In 2002, the Israeli government began construction on a barrier in and around the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory of the West Bank and Jerusalem. The West Bank is located to the 
west of the River Jordan and the Dead Sea. The western ‘border’ of the West Bank is typically 
referred to as part of the Green Line, a de facto border that the Arab Nations and Israel 
negotiated in the 1949 Armistice Agreements. Officially known as “Armistice Demarcation 
Lines,” the track known as the Green Line “[delineated] the lines beyond which the armed forces 
of [Israel and Jordan] shall not move”, as outlined in Article IV, paragraph 2 of the agreements 
(Jordanian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement). In 1967, Israel captured the West Bank 
territory, as well as other Palestinian territories, and it became the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
of the West Bank (Metz 29). This territory was seized from the jurisdiction of Jordan and is not 
recognized as part of the country of Israel, therefore, the Green Line is still referenced in modern 
discussion of Palestine and Israel. This Green Line is regarded as the spot where Israel stops and 
the territory of Palestine begins. Although this line is the de facto border, Israeli armed forces are 




 Israel proposed the barrier as a way for the government to limit Palestinians from moving 
into and out of the West Bank. Israel’s government claimed that the barrier is intended to limit 
Palestinian terrorist attacks by regulating movement with the 39 gates in the barrier that 
Palestinians are permitted to use (B’Tselem, “The Separation Barrier – Statistics”). Since 2002, 
there have been several petitions against the route of the barrier, with the Israeli High Court of 
Justice (IHCJ) declaring its illegality in specific portions of the route each time someone brought 
suit against the wall. After the most recent amendment to the route of the barrier in 2007, 85 
percent of the modified path lies to the east of the Green Line (B’Tselem, “The Separation 
Barrier”). As of 2012, approximately 60 percent of the barrier’s construction in and around the 
West Bank, including through the city of Jerusalem, has been completed, with a tenth of the 
route currently under construction. The remaining 30 percent is part of the proposed route of 
construction. As of 2011, roughly 670,000 dunams – about 170,000 acres – of the West Bank 
territory is west of the barrier (B’Tselem, “The Separation Barrier – Statistics”). There are two 
main reasons why the construction of the barrier is controversial. The first is that there is concern 
over the effects of the barrier on the rights of the Palestinian populace, such as the right to self-
determination or the right to freedom of movement. The second is that the current route of the 
barrier extends beyond the Green Line.  
As a result of these concerns being expressed by the international community, the United 
Nations General Assembly requested an Advisory Opinion on the legal consequences of the wall 
in Palestine. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), the judicial organ of the United Nations, 
published an Advisory Opinion in 2004. The Opinion contained several conclusions: 1) by 
fourteen votes to one, the construction of the wall in the West Bank and Jerusalem is illegal 




and deconstruct the barrier, 3) by fourteen votes to one, Israel is obligated to make reparations, 
4) by thirteen votes to two, all other states are obligated not to recognize the legitimacy of the 
barrier and not to supply aid to continue the construction of the barrier, and 5) by fourteen votes 
to one, the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council ought to debate how to best 
end the situation that is contrary to international law (201-202).  
 
Goals, Methodology, and Significance 
The goal of this essay is to find out what implications the 2004 ICJ Advisory Opinion’s 
conditions for the illegality of the Israeli barrier has on the use of walls/barrier in and around 
territories under foreign occupation, including partially recognized states that the occupying 
power considers part of its territory. Since the Advisory Opinion discusses, both implicitly and 
explicitly, the conditionality that makes the barrier illegal, these conditions – if legitimate – can 
be applied to other spaces where there are barriers in order to ascertain the legality of these other 
circumstances. In general, Israel and its advocates reject both the jurisdiction and the legitimacy 
of the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ in the matter of the wall. The general consensus in the 
international community is that this ruling is legitimate, evident by the UN General Assembly’s 
resolution in 2004 to comply with the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion. 150 countries voted in favor, with 
the only states to vote against the resolution being Australia, the Federated States of Micronesia, 
Israel, the Marshall Islands, Palau, and the United States (United Nations, “UN Assembly votes 
overwhelmingly to demand Israel comply with the ICJ ruling”). Because the United States is a 
permanent member on the Security Council of the UN, this resolution did not come to fruition, as 





In the course of this paper, I will briefly analyze the jurisprudence – or legal philosophy – 
of the International Court of Justice, as well as the critiques of the Advisory Opinion. I will also 
summarize Israel’s defense arguments and determine whether or not they have been rightfully 
dismissed by the ICJ. Additionally, I will study the various human rights law treaties that these 
texts reference in their judgment of the barrier in order to sufficiently understand the context in 
which these judgments were made. Then, I will apply the Advisory Opinion to another so-called 
border wall, specifically the construction of a barrier made of sand by the Moroccan government 
against the partially recognized state of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, or Western 
Sahara.  
Answering these questions will help to provide insight into two main areas in modern 
international relations. The first is that it may be possible to accurately predict the legality of the 
border constructions in Western Sahara, as well as being able to develop a sort of legality 
checklist that can be applied to any barrier construction. This will allow the territories that feel a 
barrier violates their rights to determine if their case can be brought to the ICJ with a chance of a 
result in their favor. Secondly, by determining if the two barriers are illegal or not, it is possible 
to look at the efficacy of the ICJ and UN as a whole. If the barriers are legal, then no changes 
need to be made and the ICJ must be analyzed as to why it ruled that the Israeli barrier is illegal. 
If the barriers are illegal and no changes have come from the ICJ or UN’s actions, then this calls 
their effectiveness and international political clout into question. In either case, this research 
provides an opportunity for reflection into the international governmental bodies that represent a 






Analysis of the Israeli Argument 
The main proposition for Israel is contained in three primary arguments that will be 
referred to here as the ‘self-defense argument,’ the ‘necessity argument,’ and the ‘proportionality 
argument,’ but each one of these propositions has its critique. The self-defense argument asserts 
that the right to self-defense overrides any and all human rights violations that may arise because 
of the barrier’s construction. Secondly, the necessity argument puts forth the idea that the barrier 
was only constructed out of need. Thirdly, the proportionality argument claims that the human 
rights violations that result from the barrier and the possible human rights violations of terrorism 
are equal, and therefore the barrier is justified in its construction. In the following sections, I will 
analyze and review the three pro-barrier arguments and determine their legitimacy.  
 
Analyzing the Claim to Self-Defense 
The first argument in favor of the barrier is grounded in Article 51 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, which reads: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
the individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security” (10-11). Israel uses the beginning of this clause to emphasize 
their argument that even if the wall violates international law, it acts as self-defense and is 
therefore valid, as “nothing…shall impair” the right to self-defense.  
To support this idea, Arye Schreiber argues that subsequent to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, the world “widely and rightly understood” that the right of self-defense 
applied “whether or not the attack came from a state” (160). However, his main arguments are 




academic and global assertion that after 9/11, governments “have adopted a plethora of invasive 
counterterrorism measures that expand the powers of security agencies and inflict severe legal, 
political, and economic costs” (Hegemann and Kahl 199). Schreiber fails to outline who “widely 
and rightly” understood 9/11 to constitute a broad interpretation of Article 51’s application, or to 
justify such an interpretation. In their Opinion, the ICJ argued that the right to self-defense 
applies “in the case of armed attacks by one State against another State” (194). This would mean 
that actions taken against terrorist organizations or non-state actors would be limited by other 
parts of the UN Charter and human rights law treaties. While this argument may seem to be too 
strict of an interpretation of Article 51, it could have arisen from a concern about the actions 
taken in the Middle East by Western countries in the years following the attacks on September 
11th that were justified using the argument of self-defense or national security. This idea of using 
national security as a legitimizing argument for human rights abuses is explained by Rebecca 
Sanders: 
 
In crises, law is ignored or suspended in the name of emergency. Sovereign power 
asserts itself as the real source of order, eroding the neutral, independent rule of 
law and harkening the growth of dictatorship. Other scholars have noted 
similarities between current practice and past human rights violations conducted 
in the name of national security. During the Cold War, policy makers favoured 
the doctrine of ‘plausible deniability’. Rather than openly derogate from 
constraining rules, human rights abuses at home or abroad, unsavoury alliances, 
and illegal activities were pursued covertly with the intent of evading discovery, 





This analysis of plausible deniability outlines how governments use fear and crises, which are 
most often terrorist attacks in the modern era, as opportunities to introduce new policies that 
inflict the kinds of costs that Hegemann and Kahl mention.   
 According to the ICJ, since Palestine is not recognized by Israel or the Security Council 
of the United Nations as a state, the self-defense argument does not apply in the case of the 
barrier. In order for the self-defense argument to be seen as valid by the Court, Israel would have 
to either recognize Palestine as a state, therefore giving it all the sovereignty that comes with 
such status, or destroy the current barrier and reconstruct it in such a way that the rights of the 
Palestinians are not violated.  
Additionally, I would argue that the claim that self-defense overrides any human rights 
violations cannot be made as a result of the initial rhetoric. When the UN Charter reads that 
“nothing in the present Charter” will prevent the right to self-defense, they have caught states in 
a technicality. By asserting that the current charter guarantees the self-defense override, they 
allow other documents, such as international human rights law treaties and conventions, to 
technically be above the right to a state’s right to self-defense. Therefore, the assertion by the ICJ 
that the right to self-defense does not apply in the case of armed attack by a non-state actor is 
supplementary to the language in the Charter that outlines the states’ right to self-defense in the 
first place. 
 
Examining the Assertion of Necessity 
The second argument is one that argues that the only way to defend Israel from terrorism 




barrier’s violations of international law.  Yet for this case to be acceptable, the Israeli 
government would have had no other option to prevent terrorist attacks than to build this barrier. 
No other policies or tactics, whether they be more or less feasible, would have to exist. The ICJ 
mentioned that according to global treaties, the state claiming necessity is not the sole judge of 
this conditionality (195). Next, the Court stated that they are “not convinced that the construction 
of the wall along the route chosen” is the only way to protect Israel from terrorist attacks (195). 
This is important to note, because all of the reasons why the barrier violates international law are 
founded on the fact that it extends beyond the Green Line, effectively acquiring territory for 
Israel and creating enclaves, therefore significantly impeding on the Palestinians’ right to 
freedom of movement and right to self-determination. Self-determination is outlined in Article 3 
and 4 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) as the 
ability of a people to “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development,” as well as the right to “autonomy or self-government in 
matters relation to their internal and local affairs” (4-5). By passing through the Palestinian 
territory and restricting movement within the territory, the barrier restricts these abilities, as well 
as diminishing or eliminating any notion of Palestinian autonomy.  
The Israeli High Court of Justice (ICHJ) has taken a similar approach, issuing very 
specific rulings that focus on the route of the wall, which has been revised again and again 
(B’Tselem, “The Separation Barrier”). The IHCJ’s main concern seems to be that the route of the 
wall has created enclaves and limited the Palestinians’ access to things like hospitals and 
schools. This would be comparable to the ICJ’s jurisprudence, though the ICJ was concerned 
with the wall as a whole, rather than focusing on particular sections of the wall. This focus on the 




constructed either along the Green Line or solely on Israeli territory, then a much lower number 
of human rights violations would have occurred and the conversation would solely be about 
Palestinians traveling back and forth between the West Bank and territory held by Israel.  
 
Evaluating the Notion of Proportionality 
The third argument is that when weighed against each other, the human rights abuses 
perpetrated by the Israeli barrier and the threat of terrorism are proportional. In order for this 
argument to hold true, then there must be minimal violations of human rights. This would be true 
either because human rights law treaties do not apply to Palestine or for the barrier to not violate 
a significant number of rights. To advocate for this methodology, Israel has asserted that the 
International Covenant of Political and Civil Rights (ICPCR) does not apply to Palestine in the 
case of the wall because “humanitarian law is the protection granted in a conflict situation,” 
while human rights are “intended for the protection of citizens from their own Government in 
times of peace” (qtd. in International Court of Justice, 177). This is to say that because Palestine 
is under foreign occupation and because there are numerous clashes between Israelis and 
Palestinians – be it settlers, civilians, or militants – Palestine is in a “conflict situation.” Under 
the Israeli assertion human rights law treaties such as the ICPCR would not apply, while under 
peaceful circumstances, human rights law would apply. 
This justification could work, considering that the stated reason for the construction of 
the wall is to defend Israel from Palestinian terrorism. However, there is one strange aspect of 
this argument’s rhetoric. It makes very little sense for the words “from their own Government” to 
be in this line of reasoning. Palestine is under foreign occupation by the Israeli government, and 




human rights in the Occupied Territories of Palestine as outlined in Article 73 of the UN Charter 
(14). Nevertheless, the Court rejected this argument, saying that the human rights outlined in the 
Covenant referenced do “not cease in times of war” (177). Therefore, the rights outlined in the 
ICPCR do apply in the case of the barrier. Moreover, the Court asserts that the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
apply to Palestine in all situations, not just in the debate over the barrier (192). Consequently, not 
only do the rights outlined in the ICPCR apply to Palestine, but they must also apply to all 
territories, regardless of the presence or absence of conflict.  
By arguing that human rights law cannot apply to Palestine, given Israel’s rejection of the 
ICPCR in regards to the current issue, Israel is basing their argument in this case on the concept 
that is known as ‘legal-space theory.’ Legal-space theory asserts that actions of one state inside 
the borders of another “would not be governed by the Convention obligations of the first State, if 
the second State is not also a party to the Convention” (Wilde, 670). To simplify this analysis, 
legal-space theory allows one state to violate human rights law treaties in another state as long as 
the latter has not signed the treaty. This is yet another inherent problem, as some agreements are 
only signed by very specific states, usually the states that are considered the ‘global North.’  This 
means that the powerful nations of the world would be able to abuse the human rights agreed 
upon in these conventions, as long as these human rights abuses took place in countries that are 
not also signatories – which are usually the countries with less clout and influence. Furthermore, 
the phrasing of this model limits human rights law treaties and conventions to territories that are 
internationally or overwhelmingly recognized as states. By enforcing these conventions 
exclusively on those countries that were parties of these treaties, a “two-tier system of human 




human rights law treaties while others are not (Wilde 671). If the ICJ had ruled that human rights 
law treaties did not apply to Palestine, whether it be the lack of statehood, then human rights 
violations could legally take place in myriad regions across the globe. Regions like the Sahrawi 
Arab Democratic Republic (declared independence from Morocco), Kosovo (declared 
independence from Serbia), Abkhazia (declared independence from Georgia), the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (declared independence from Cyprus), South Ossetia (declared 
independence from Georgia), the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (declared independence from 
Azerbaijan), the Transnistria (declared independence from Moldova), and Somaliland (declared 
independence from Somalia) would not be protected from human rights violations by the 
countries that they declared their independence from. Secondly, if the ICJ had limited the reach 
of human rights law treaties by saying that they did not apply in times of war, then violations 
could occur in any country that is involved in an armed conflict at the time of the violation.  
Schreiber counters the ICJ’s jurisprudence with the assertion that the Court ought to have 
weighed the rights and obligations that the wall contradicted against the violations of 
international law or abuses of human rights that the law is meant to prevent and therefore did not 
properly address the issue of proportionality (160). This argument makes sense in the discipline 
of foreign policy; it is important to do cost/benefit analyses in decision-making. However, I 
argue that in order to weigh these two against each other, one would have to compare the value 
of human lives on either side of the wall. This would violate the very concept of human rights, 
which are meant to show the equality of all individuals in the face of the law and of governance. 
Furthermore, I would argue that if these two were to be weighed against each other, Israel would 
not have won its right to the construction of the barrier. This is because in the 92 communities 




is severely limited (B’Tselem, “The Separation Barrier – Statistics”). And as Steve Niva points 
out, the barrier has actually increased the number of suicide bombings and destroyed Palestinian 
infrastructure, leaving the administrative arena vulnerable to extremist groups such as Hamas 
(78). So the violations that the barrier was meant to prevent have actually been exacerbated, 
though conveniently contained only within the Occupied Palestinian Territories, while the 
violations that the barrier is causing are not alleviated.  
 
Drawing Conclusions and Developing Conditions 
 To summarize, the barrier is contrary to international law for several reasons. Firstly, it 
significantly impedes on the Palestinian right to self-determination. This right is outlined in the 
United Nations Charter and was expanded to include non-self-governing territories. The wall 
impedes on the right to self-determination by creating a “de facto annexation” of Palestinian 
territory that interferes with territorial sovereignty, something that non-self-governing territories 
do have (181). Secondly, the barrier limits access to healthcare, education. In its very essence, 
the barrier prevents movement. This would not be an issue if only the movement into Israel was 
limited, but Palestinians’ freedom of movement is restricted when traveling from areas of the 
West Bank to other areas of the West Bank due to the course of the barrier and the enclaves it 
creates. All of these violations of international law arise from the route of the barrier. If it had 
stayed on or behind the Green Line, then none of these specific human rights abuses or 
international law violations would have occurred.  
 Therefore, the conditions which make the Israeli barrier contradictory to international law 
are: 1) the de facto annexation of territory, which is done by extending the barrier beyond the 








If we then take these conditions and apply them to other barriers across the globe, we can 
determine if they contradict international law – or at the very least if a case could be made for 
their illegality in the International Court of Justice. In this section of the essay, I will apply the 
conditions outlined in the ICJ’s 2004 Advisory Opinion to the Moroccan built barrier in the 
disputed territory of the Western Sahara. To do this, I will briefly summarize the post-
colonization history of the region. After properly outlining the situation, I will then apply the 
conditions outlined above. I have chosen this case study for two main reasons. The first is that 
unlike the Israeli barrier, the Moroccan barrier is not in the front of the public consciousness. 
Secondly, this is a case of a state building barriers as part of an occupation in another state’s 
territory, though it is a disputed territory. The analysis and application will be based on whether 
or not this barrier fits the conditions outlined above.  
 
The Moroccan Berm 
 In order to properly apply the conditions outlined above, we must first understand the 
history of the Moroccan barrier in Western Sahara. Western Sahara is a disputed territory that 
lies directly to the south of the country of Morocco and was released from Spanish rule in 1975. 
Previously, during the process of decolonization, the 1974 International Court of Justice ruling 
asserted that the indigenous Sahrawi tribes in the region known as Western Sahara did have the 




its own political entity after Spain left. However, Morocco and Mauritania, the state that is just 
south of Western Sahara, moved in to claim the region. In defense, the Sahrawis founded the 
Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro, or POLISARIO, as the military 
and political organization of Western Sahara. Mauritania was pushed out by POLISARIO forces 
and recognized the establishment of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), which was 
founded in 1976 (Farah 77).  
Though Mauritania recognized the SADR and pulled its troops out of Western Sahara, 
Morocco continued to claim sovereignty over the region – despite there being no other country 
that recognized this claim (Farah 77). In 1980, the Moroccan government began construction on 
a barrier in the northwestern corner of Western Sahara, known as the “useful triangle” and 
encircled roughly 15% of the territory (Damis 165). This was the first barrier that Morocco 
constructed in Western Sahara. Morocco built up more barriers to the south and east, each one 
farther into Western Sahara than the one that preceded it. By 1987, six barriers had been built 
(“The end”; Damis 165). Roughly seven feet tall, the longest portion of the completed barrier 
runs over 1,000 miles from the northeastern corner of the region to the southwestern coast in a 
diagonal, snaking line. It is composed of compacted sand, barbed wire, and an unknown amount 
of landmines (Damis 165). The Sahrawis have named this barrier “the wall of shame” and call 
the territory that Morocco encircled the “occupied territories” (“Minister of Communication”; 
Copete 12). Morocco, on the other hand, dubbed the wall “the Defensive Wall” (“Minister of 
Communication”). For the purpose of this essay, we will refer to this barrier as ‘the Moroccan 
Berm,’ with a berm being a wall constructed out of compacted sand.  
The construction of walls that moved farther south each time constitutes the “territorial 




(International Court of Justice 137). The argument for self-defense or necessity would likely be 
used by the Moroccan government. However, the acquisition of territory by force is neither 
necessary nor justifiable in terms of self-defense. Many states have launched military campaigns 
in foreign soil without establishing a continuous block of territory that is considered to be a part 
of that state’s territory. The argument of necessity would also be brushed aside fairly easily, 
considering that in order to protect their civilians from Sahrawi forces, Morocco could have 
simply built a berm on their internationally recognized border and then launched a military 
campaign in the south to prevent attacks on their territory.  
Moreover, the Sahrawi POLISARIO forces and the SADR are not recognized by the 
Moroccan government, meaning that the ICJ would disregard the argument of self-defense 
because of their interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter. Furthermore, as I previously 
mentioned, Article 51 could be interpreted in such a way that does not allow for the argument of 
self-defense to override the inherent right to self-determination that the Sahrawis have, as 
asserted by the UN General Assembly (Rice-Oxley et al.). In regards to the argument that has – 
rarely and wrongly – been used to defend the Israeli barrier that Israel is the administrative entity 
over the West Bank and therefore has the power to construct the wall in the territory, Morocco is 
not recognized as the sovereign nor the administrative power of Western Sahara (Copete 12).  
However, because the berm does not create enclaves within territory that Morocco does 
not occupy, the barrier does not obviously restrict access to other guaranteed rights. Though, it 
could be interpreted as preventing Sahrawi access to rights because the majority of highly 
populated cities and resources in the region are behind the Moroccan Berm (Damis 165; Brown 








By analyzing the rhetoric of both the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion and some of its main 
critiques, it is possible to develop a sort of illegality checklist. The conditions for illegality that 
are outlined by the ICJ and have stood up as legitimate are that the barrier creates a forceful 
acquisition of territory by a foreign entity, the barrier violates the populations’ inalienable right 
to self-determination, or the barrier violates human rights like access to healthcare, education or 
freedom of movement within one’s own territory. It is then logical to take these conditions that 
applied to the barrier in and around the West Bank and apply them to other barriers across the 
globe. Looking at the Moroccan berm, these conditions are met. The Moroccan berm especially 
constitutes a forceful acquisition of territory, considering the construction of walls that move 
farther and farther into territory that was considered the Sahrawis’, though it may not restrict the 
Sahrawis’ access to other rights in the portion of Western Sahara that is not occupied by 
Morocco.  
As for the efficacy of the ICJ, it is logical to question its ability to bring about any real 
legal change in the situations on which it delivers rulings or advisory opinions. In both cases 
outlined above, the ICJ issued legal documents outlining the illegality of the situation and the 
situation did not change. In the case of Israel, no change occured because of the veto power of 
the UN Security Council. In this area, I would suggest research into the reasons behind both the 




Due to the high number of walls built and proposed, I highly recommend further research 
into the conditions of these barriers. Namely, investigation into the American built walls in Iraqi 
cities during the height of wall construction in order to ascertain the legality of the so-called 
“surge” program (Niva 56). Additionally, I would recommend investigation into the application 
of these conditions to other barriers that are along borers, namely those between Iraq and Saudi 
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